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Policing Online Fraud in Australia:  
The Emergence of a Victim‐oriented 
Approach 
Abstract 
Online fraud is a global problem. Millions of individuals worldwide are losing money and 
experiencing the devastation associated with becoming a victim of online fraud. In 2014, 
Australians reported losses of $82 million as a result of online fraud to the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Given that the ACCC is one of many 
agencies that receives victim complaints, and the extent of under‐reporting of online fraud, 
this figure is likely to represent only a fraction of the actual monetary losses incurred. The 
successful policing of online fraud is hampered by its transnational nature, the prevalence of 
false/stolen identities used by offenders, and a lack of resources available to investigate 
offences. In addition, police are restricted by the geographical boundaries of their own 
jurisdictions which conflicts with the lack of boundaries afforded to offenders by the virtual 
world.  
In response to this, Australia is witnessing the emergence of victim‐oriented policing 
approaches to counter online fraud victimisation. This incorporates the use of financial 
intelligence as a tool to proactively notify potential victims of online fraud. Using a variety of 
Australian examples, this paper documents the history to this new approach and considers 
the significance that such a shift represents to policing in a broader context. It also details 
the value that this approach can have to both victims and law enforcement agencies. 
Overall, it is argued that a victim‐oriented approach to policing online fraud can have 
substantial benefits to police and victims alike.  
Introduction 
Online fraud is a global phenomenon which devastates the lives of millions. In Australia 
alone, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (2015) reported 
individual losses to victims of fraud at $82 million for 2014. Given that the ACCC is just one 
of many bodies that can take reports, coupled with the large underreporting of online fraud 
offences, this figure is likely to be the tip of a substantial iceberg. Despite the large 
monetary losses, there is little that law enforcement agencies can do. Online fraud has a 
number of unique characteristics which mean that traditional methods of policing are not 
effective. Consequently, police agencies have had to rethink their approaches to online 
fraud.  
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As a result, Australia has witnessed the emergence of a victim-oriented approach to policing 
online fraud which uses financial intelligence to proactively identify and contact potential 
online victims. This paper examines the rise of this and explores the impact and 
effectiveness of this approach for both victims and law enforcement agencies. First, this 
paper provides an overview of online fraud and the characteristics which lead to such high 
levels of underreporting as well as the inability to use traditional methods of enforcement. 
Second, the paper details the rise of victim-oriented approaches, using a combination of 
police and consumer protection agencies examples from Queensland, Western Australia, 
South Australia, and federally with the ACCC. These agencies and jurisdictions have been 
chosen as they are the ones across Australia who have implemented this particular 
approach. Third, this paper considers the effects of this approach in terms of the impact on 
victims and for policing as a whole. Overall, this paper documents the emergence of victim-
oriented approaches to online fraud through the use of financial intelligence and argues 
that there are strong benefits to this type of response which warrant further analysis. To 
date, there is only one known paper (Cross and Blackshaw 2015) which has examined this 
approach specifically as it operates in Western Australia, and there are likely benefits that 
international agencies can learn via the Australian example.  
Background and context to online fraud 
Online fraud can be defined as ‘the experience of an individual who has responded through 
the use of the Internet to a dishonest invitation, request, notification or offer by providing 
personal information or money which has led to the suffering of a financial or non-financial 
loss of some kind’ (Cross et al. 2014: 1). Online fraud is not a new crime; rather the internet 
has enabled fraud to be perpetrated in different ways, and on a much larger scale than 
previously (Yar 2013). The internet provides an easy mechanism for offenders to contact 
potential victims on a very cost effective basis, and in addition, it offers a layer of protection 
for offenders through the increased level of anonymity offered by the internet compared to 
face-to-face interactions (Yar, 2013). This has had a significant impact on how fraud has 
been perpetrated in recent decades.  
Offenders can use an endless number of approaches to target potential victims. However, 
there are two categories of online fraud which dominate victim statistics: advance fee fraud 
and romance fraud. Advance fee fraud (AFF) is when a victim is asked to send a small 
amount of money in return for a larger amount of money promised in the future (Ross and 
Smith 2011). Typically, if the victim complies, the requests for money continue and may 
escalate in amount. It is commonplace for victims to lose tens of thousands, if not hundreds 
of thousands of dollars as a result. AFF can disguise itself as business and investment 
opportunities, unexpected lottery wins, inheritance notifications and/or employment 
schemes.  
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A derivative of AFF is romance fraud, though this is now an established category in its own 
right. Romance fraud uses the premise of a legitimate relationship to extract (often large) 
amounts of money from a victim (Rege 2009). The use of online dating and social media 
sites for people to establish new relationships has proliferated and this has seen an 
emergence of romance fraud as a dominant method of defrauding unsuspecting victims. 
Offenders develop trust and rapport to mirror a genuine relationship and then target the 
vulnerabilities of individuals through this relationship to financially exploit victims. This type 
of fraud is one of the most devastating for victims, as they not only lose money but they also 
grieve the loss of the relationship (Whitty and Buchanan 2012).  
While these categories of fraud tend to originate in an online environment, it is important to 
recognise that offenders will use all mediums of communication. Fraud still occurs in face-
to-face situations, as well as traditional mail and telephone scenarios. Highly skilled 
offenders will now use a combination of all communication methods to establish and 
maintain a connection with victims. This includes email, messaging services, webcam, text 
messages, telephone calls and face to face interactions to perpetuate their lies and extract 
the largest amount of money possible out of individual victims. Offenders will use a range of 
social engineering techniques designed to persuade victims into compliance with any 
request (Drew and Cross 2013).  
Policing online fraud  
Historically, fraud has not been the priority of police agencies (Button 2012). Apart from the 
City of London Police in the UK (who are the lead agency for economic crime in the UK and 
located in the financial capital of the world), most police agencies do not have fraud as a 
stated priority for their organisation. While there is recent evidence to suggest that 
resources targeting fraud are increasing in the UK (Button et al. 2015), it is still arguable that 
the problem posed by fraud and economic crime more broadly is not commensurate with 
overall police resources. Within Australia, there are no specific details of the number of 
police nationally who are dedicated to investigating fraud, nor which unit they are attached 
to within each police organisation.  
Regardless of the extent of police resources and the level of priority given to fraud, there 
are unique characteristics that create distinct challenges in policing online fraud. The 
traditional “reactive” approach to fraud is not viable, given the lack of reports received by 
police agencies from victims and the inability of police to investigate compared to other 
types of crime. Broadly speaking, fraud has one of the lowest reporting rates across all crime 
types (Button et al. 2014). Studies across the UK, USA and Canada estimate that less than 
one-third of all victims report fraud to authorities (Schoepfer and Piquero 2009). This is also 
consistent with Australian research (Smith 2007; Smith 2008). Further, there is evidence to 
suggest that fraud experienced in an online context is less likely to be reported compared to 
fraud perpetrated in an offline context (Smith 2007; Smith 2008). There are several 
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established reasons for victims not reporting online fraud, which include the shame and 
stigma associated with this particular crime type (Cross 2015), not knowing who to report to 
(Button et al. 2012) and a lack of consistent definitions on what constitutes an offence 
(Button et al. 2012). Added to this, are several unique characteristics of online fraud which 
present as barriers to police taking action (see Button 2012; Cross and Blackshaw 2015). The 
first is the transnational nature of the offence. In most circumstances, offenders, victims and 
the money are in separate countries. While the internet can be understood as one global 
jurisdiction, police agencies are still founded upon geographical boundaries for their 
authority. It is therefore difficult to ascertain which police agency is responsible for 
investigating the complaint. The second challenge focuses on identity crime, where 
offenders take on the identity of a legitimate person or company, or may create a 
completely false and fictitious identity to perpetrate their crimes. The third is the 
technological aspects of online offences, whereby police may not have the required skills or 
expertise to understand or investigate an offence which has been perpetrated in a virtual 
environment. Lastly, legislation is inadequate to address the problem of online fraud, given 
there is no consistency in definitions and there are usually multiple jurisdictions involved. 
Overall, this compounds the investigative challenges and online fraud poses serious 
challenges for police agencies in framing their ability to investigate an offence, even if the 
priority was there (Cross and Blackshaw 2015).  
Given the severity of these challenges, the need for an alternative approach is clearly 
apparent. The reactive, investigative policing model is neither suitable nor effective for this 
crime type. On this basis, victim-oriented approaches using financial intelligence to 
proactively identify potential online fraud victims have emerged. This acknowledges that it 
is of greater benefit to target a reduction in the amount of money being transferred as the 
result of fraud and consequently decrease victimisation, rather than attempt to investigate 
and prosecute after victimisation has occurred. The following section examines how this 
approach has emerged in Australia.  
The emergence of victim-oriented approaches using financial 
intelligence 
As established, online fraud poses distinct challenges to law enforcement. Therefore, 
Australian authorities have turned to the use of financial intelligence in a victim-oriented 
approach to reducing the losses and harm sustained to victims experiencing online fraud. 
Financial intelligence refers to the documented financial transactions that take place 
between Australia and overseas. There is no monetary limit to the transaction; instead 
identification is based purely on the geographical location of the transaction. The following 
presents a chronological account of victim-oriented approaches to policing online fraud 
through the use of financial intelligence and focuses on each of the relevant agencies and 
jurisdictions (Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and the ACCC) who have 
implemented this approach.  
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Queensland 
The Queensland Police Service (QPS) was the first Australian agency to recognise online 
fraud as a legitimate crime problem and is arguably the jurisdiction that has pioneered the 
victim-oriented approach to this crime worldwide. This started in late 2005, with anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that online fraud (predominantly Nigerian based) was a problem, but 
with no recorded statistics to support this assertion (Hay 2015). Police obtained a list of 26 
people who were sending money to Nigeria and police officers called those on the list to ask 
them the circumstances surrounding their transactions. Of the 26 individuals, 25 were 
identified as victims of online fraud who had collectively lost $7.2M (Hay 2015: 1). Even 
more disturbingly, some victims had been sending money for over a decade, but had not 
made any complaints to the police (Hay 2015: 1). Consequently, the QPS commenced 
Operation Echo Track, where they used financial intelligence to identify 139 individuals 
sending money to Nigeria. Police called these people to ask the reasons surrounding the 
transactions and 134 individuals were found to be victims of fraud who had lost $18.2M 
collectively (Collins 2015: 4). Three years later, QPS initiated Operation Hotel Fortress, which 
identified 200 people sending money to Nigeria and again questioned them on the 
circumstances surrounding the money transfers. In this group, 186 were identified as victims 
of online fraud, who had lost in excess of $21.5M (Collins 2015: 5). In combination, the 
results from both Echo Track and Hotel Fortress indicate the substantial losses incurred 
through online fraud and also illustrate the pervasive nature of victimisation. In most cases, 
victims did not realise they were being defrauded, had not reported it to the police, and 
sadly, in some cases, continued to send money after police intervention. Since this time, 
QPS has “intermittently undertaken approaches to potential victims, advising them of the 
scam and warning them against continuing to send money” (Queensland Organised Crime 
Commission of Inquiry 2015: 401) and currently have no specific project identifying 
potential advance fee fraud victims (Queensland Organised Crime Commission of Inquiry 
2015: 402). However, this proactive approach initiated by the QPS to contact potential 
victims through the use of financial intelligence can be seen as a turning point for the 
policing of online fraud in Australia.  
Western Australia 
Taking their lead from Queensland, the West Australian Police (WAPOL) established 
Operation Sunbird in 2012 to target AFF victimisation in Western Australia. This was later 
renamed Project Sunbird, and a formal partnership was entered between WAPOL and the 
West Australian Department of Commerce (Commerce), who were also concerned about 
the victimisation of individuals (Department of Commerce nd).  
Project Sunbird targets financial transactions sent between West Australia and five West 
African countries: Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Benin (Department of Commerce 
2014). It is a five stage process, with the stages shared between both agencies. The first is 
identification, whereby WAPOL access financial intelligence. They screen this list for likely 
legitimate transactions and then forward the remaining details to Commerce. The second 
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stage is intervention, whereby Commerce sends a letter to the households on the list, which 
acknowledges that the person is sending money to one of the five identified countries and 
outlines the reasons why WAPOL/Commerce believe the recipient may be a victim of fraud. 
The letter encourages the cessation of financial transactions and provides a point of contact 
to discuss the matter further. If the individual continues to send money three months after 
this initial letter, a second letter is sent, outlining the belief that the person could be a fraud 
victim and encouraging the termination of transactions. In addition, a fact sheet developed 
specifically for victims of fraud is enclosed with this second letter.  
The third stage is interruption, whereby Commerce liaises with banks, remittance agencies, 
and other relevant organisations, to block accounts of identified offenders and potential 
victims. This also includes education campaigns and media releases to increase the overall 
awareness. The fourth stage revolves around intelligence, and takes information gathered 
by Commerce and WAPOL from the letter recipients who make contact. This then leads into 
the last stage, investigation, whereby WAPOL focus on local offenders if relevant or make 
appropriate referrals of intelligence to other national and international police agencies (see 
Cross and Blackshaw 2015 for further details about Project Sunbird). Project Sunbird is an 
ongoing part of the work undertaken by WAPOL and Commerce.  
South Australia 
In a very similar operation to their West Australian counterparts, the South Australian Police 
(SAPOL) established Operation Disrepair in 2013 (SAPOL 2014: 27). This targeted South 
Australians who were transferring funds to Nigeria and Ghana (SAPOL 2014: 27). In a similar 
approach to Project Sunbird, SAPOL identify potential victims and send a letter out which 
conveys their suspicion that the individual may be a victim of online fraud (Nankervis 2014). 
The stages mirror that of Project Sunbird, with the only difference being that SAPOL are not 
working in partnership with a consumer protection agency, rather they undertake the five 
stages themselves. To this day, Operation Disrepair continues to alert potential victims in 
South Australia.  
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
In August 2014, the ACCC launched their National Scams Disruption Project, which adopted 
the same model of Project Sunbird and Operation Disrepair. The most notable difference is 
that the ACCC is a consumer protection body and not law enforcement. The National Scams 
Disruption Project initially targeted citizens across New South Wales and the Australian 
Capital Territory who were sending money to either Nigeria or Ghana. In 2015, this has been 
expanded to include Victoria, Tasmania, and the Northern Territory (ACCC 2015: 2) and is 
ongoing across each of these jurisdictions. Similar to Sunbird and Disrepair, the ACCC access 
financial intelligence to send letters to individuals considered likely fraud victims and 
encourage them to desist their money transfers (Bainbridge 2014). While the ACCC is an 
enforcement body in its own right, it has different law enforcement powers and therefore 
works in collaboration with local police as required.  
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Examining the use of financial intelligence to reduce online fraud 
As detailed, several Australian agencies and jurisdictions now employ a victim-oriented 
approach to targeting online fraud victimisation. They use financial intelligence specifically 
aimed at individuals who are sending money to known high risk West African nations, and 
who are suspected victims. This proactive approach has seen a combination of police and 
consumer protection agencies send letters to possible fraud victims to advise them of their 
suspicions and to encourage the recipients to cease money transfers.  
The use of financial intelligence to actively contact potential victims represents a large shift 
in policing. Traditionally, police have relied upon individuals being able to identify 
themselves as victims and contact police to lodge a complaint. In most circumstances, police 
do not actively contact individuals to inform them of their likely victim status. However, this 
new proactive model has distinct benefits when applied to online fraud. As previously 
stated, the majority of online fraud victims do not realise they are in fraudulent situations 
where they are involved with criminals. Rather, they believe they are involved in legitimate 
business/romantic relationships. A person who is unaware that a crime is being perpetrated 
against them is highly unlikely to report this to authorities (Hay 2015: 1).  
The use of dedicated operations to target online fraud overcomes some of the barriers 
experienced by victims who do attempt to report their experiences. It is well established 
that fraud victims face many hurdles in navigating the vast array of agencies who could take 
a complaint, which includes police, consumer protection and financial institutions (Button et 
al. 2012; Cross et al. forthcoming). The establishment of Project Sunbird, Operation 
Disrepair, and the National Scams Disruption Project ensures that letter recipients can 
directly engage with an agency who understands their situation. This removes any confusion 
that victims may have in locating an appropriate authority that understands the nature of 
online fraud victimisation. It also removes the likelihood that the agency will not accept a 
complaint or attempt to refer them to another agency.  
The establishment of these approaches also gives official acknowledgement to online fraud 
as a legitimate crime problem, and recognises the status of those who have experienced 
online fraud as legitimate victims (Cross and Blackshaw 2015). Police are able to use 
financial intelligence to better understand the nature and extent of the problem and 
consequently, this enables them to more effectively respond. There is strong evidence to 
demonstrate the strength of the victim blaming discourse towards online fraud victims 
(Cross 2015) and many victims of online fraud experience immense difficulties in getting an 
agency to understand their situation. Instead, they are subjected to direct and indirect 
victim blaming attitudes from agencies, the trivialisation of their circumstances, or being 
told they are not a victim of crime in the first place (Cross et al. forthcoming). This can have 
a devastating effect on victims and exacerbate the trauma that they are already 
experiencing (Cross et al. forthcoming). Approaches which stem from a law enforcement or 
consumer protection agency portray an image to the wider public that online fraud is a real 
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crime that can have detrimental impacts on the lives of its victims. Over time, this may 
contribute to a countering of the negative stereotype that currently exists for this particular 
group of victims (Cross 2015).  
Initial analyses from Project Sunbird, Operation Disrepair, and the National Scams 
Disruption Project indicate positive results. For example, Project Sunbird staff report that 
approximately six out of ten letter recipients cease sending money after receiving the initial 
letter (Department of Commerce 2014). A further four out of ten stop sending money after 
receipt of the second letter (Department of Commerce 2014). In South Australia, Operation 
Disrepair staff observed that out of 781 letters sent to 600 suspected victims (across July 
2013- June 2014) only 70 individuals were recorded as continuing to send money (SAPOL 
2015: 27). Similar success was recorded by the ACCC, in that approximately 70 percent of 
letter recipients desisted with transactions to all overseas countries (for at least a six week 
period) (ACCC 2015: 2). Overall, these early results show promise as to the effectiveness of 
this approach in reducing the number of victims of online fraud as well as reducing the large 
degree of financial losses incurred as a result of this particular crime. To date, one study has 
examined Project Sunbird in detail (see Cross and Blackshaw 2015) and this reiterates the 
positive impact observed of this approach in its infancy.  
Despite these encouraging statistics, it is also important to acknowledge the limitations to 
this approach which arise from both the approach itself and the data to date. It is clear that 
Project Sunbird, Operation Disrepair and the National Scams Disruption Project have 
recorded encouraging results from the initial evaluation of their intervention. However, 
each jurisdiction has a different timeframe through which they follow up letter recipients to 
determine if they continue to send money. For Project Sunbird, this is three months (Cross 
and Blackshaw 2015) and for the National Scams Disruption Project, it is six weeks (ACCC 
2015: 2). In addition, the current monitoring of financial transactions only encompasses a 
small number of West African countries. All operations target Nigeria and Ghana, but only 
Project Sunbird covers the additional countries of Benin, Sierra Leonne, and Togo to initially 
identify potential victims. There are restrictions to explore financial transactions outside 
these West African countries. Therefore, it is not well documented whether victims stop 
sending money completely, whether they stop and then start again, or whether there is a 
displacement effect, whereby victims continue sending money to other countries, or via 
other means.  
This is overcome in the National Scams Disruption Project whereby the ACCC use Nigeria 
and Ghana to identify potential victims, but monitor financial transactions across all 
countries to determine if the person has stopped sending money completely. Only those 
who have ceased all transactions (not just Nigeria and Ghana) are included in the 
percentage counts. However for Sunbird and Disrepair, the data can only ascertain that a 
victim is not sending money to a specific range of countries over a restricted period of time. 
Further work is needed in this area to more rigorously evaluate the sending patterns of 
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letter recipients and determine the actual extent of their transfer activity. It is also 
important to determine whether the preliminary data obtained by the ACCC, showing a 
large percentage of alleged victims cease overseas transfers completely, translates both to 
other jurisdictions and across a longer period of time. This would likewise help to determine 
the true impact that receiving a letter has on a potential online fraud victim. At present, 
there is no direct evidence to demonstrate that the letter is the catalyst for recipients to 
cease their transactions. Anecdotal evidence received by each of these three jurisdictions is 
overwhelmingly positive from letter recipients who are appreciative of receiving a letter, 
and to date indicates the letter as a factor in their decision to stop sending money. 
However, there is scope for further research in this area.  
The future of victim-oriented approaches 
This paper has documented the emergence of victim-oriented approaches to targeting 
online fraud in Australia, through the use of financial intelligence to identify potential 
victims. Given the nature and characteristics of online fraud, its low reporting rate and the 
challenges faced by law enforcement in attempting to investigate this crime, the emergence 
of an alternative approach is a welcome development. The use of financial intelligence to 
target online fraud victims was pioneered by the QPS in 2006. Since then, this approach has 
been embraced and further refined across other Australian jurisdictions, through sending 
letters to potential victims of online fraud. There is currently no known approach used by 
any international agency or jurisdiction which is equivalent.  
This approach challenges traditional reactive investigative policing methods. However, there 
are strong arguments as to why it is both an appropriate and effective means to target 
online fraud. First, it overcomes the barrier of individuals needing to identify themselves as 
victims. Second, it provides a safe means to engage with authorities. Third, it acknowledges 
online fraud as a legitimate crime problem and recognises those who experience it as 
genuine victims. Overall, this approach has the ability to overcome some of the most 
pressing needs articulated by online fraud victims and the negativity currently associated 
with their reporting experiences (Cross et al. forthcoming).  
While there are limitations to current knowledge on the effectiveness of using financial 
intelligence to target online fraud and many opportunities for further research in this area, 
overall it is argued that current evidence provides a strong platform on which to continue 
this approach into the future. It is hoped that both law enforcement and consumer 
protection agencies recognise the emerging value of this approach to online fraud and 
continue to work together to reduce the nature and extent of online fraud for victims across 
Australia. Online fraud is unlikely to disappear in coming years and therefore it is imperative 
that alternatives such as those employed by Project Sunbird, Operation Disrepair, and the 
National Scams Disruption Project remain firmly on the agendas of law enforcement and 
consumer protection agencies nationwide.   
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